Quoting Gerhard L. Weinberg’s Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II, pages 151–153:

When the German–Polish agreement was first under consideration, Hitler explained to Rauschning the possibility of a joint German–Polish military action against Soviet Russia. From his talk with Piłsudski in December 1933, Rauschning was convinced that the Poles would never agree to such a scheme.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, Hitler returned to this theme a year later. Around the first anniversary of the German–Polish agreement of 26 January 1934, the subject was apparently on Hitler’s mind. He gave a pleasant public interview to the semiofficial Gazeta Polska⁶¹ after discussing with Lipski, the Polish ambassador, the possibility of a joint German–Polish defense against the Soviet Union in preference to a German alliance with the Soviet Union, dividing Poland between them.⁶²

The new president of the Danzig Senate, Arthur Greiser, had just made a successful visit to Warsaw; now Göring was to go to Poland.⁶³ Hitler’s instructions to Göring may well have reflected his exuberance as a result of the Saar plebiscite; in any case, Hitler and Göring spent several days together at the Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden between the plebiscite and Göring’s departure on his “hunting trip.”⁶⁴ It would appear that Göring was to hunt for something other than wildlife.

The available evidence indicates that Göring was instructed to raise with the Polish government, and particularly with Marshal Piłsudski, the possibility of a German–Polish military alliance against Russia in which a successful war would lead to Polish expansion into the Soviet Ukraine and [Fascist] expansion into the area of the Baltic states and North Russia. Such an arrangement might involve leaving the Polish Corridor unchanged, in which case Lithuania would go to [the Third Reich], or shifting the corridor by substituting Polish control of Lithuania for its present access to the sea, with [the Third Reich] controlling the area beyond Lithuania.⁶⁵

The Poles were friendly and courteous, they extended themselves to make Göring’s trip agreeable, and they assured their distinguished guest of their continued interest in amicable German–Polish relations. In spite of Göring’s allusions to the alternative possibility of a German–Soviet agreement to partition [sic] Poland, however, the Polish leaders made it quite clear that they would not have any part in such an alliance. They knew that if such a scheme failed they would lose their independence to the Soviet Union; if it succeeded, they would lose their independence to [the Third Reich].

The men who looked upon themselves as the architects of Polish independence were not interested in either possibility in 1935 any more than in 1939. They were prepared to go a considerable way in cooperation with [the Third Reich], even at the risk of annoying their French ally, but not to the extent of allying themselves with [the Third Reich] and thereby throwing themselves upon the mercy of Berlin.⁶⁶

This episode throws light both on [the Fascist bourgeoisie’s] long-range goals and on the limits of German–Polish friendship. Evidence of later [Fascist] approaches to Poland indicates that Hitler kept in mind the possibility of joint operations against Russia in spite of the fact that Göring had been politely waved off. With no wish simply to regain the German borders of 1914, Hitler was prepared to have Poland play some subordinate part in the schemes of territorial aggrandizement [that] he visualized for the future.

But while he found the Polish government unwilling to associate itself with such dangerous enterprise, he could see from the very mild Polish reaction to [the German Reich’s] reintroduction of conscription in March 1935 that that country was still willing to operate diplomatically in concert with [the Third Reich] and independently of France.⁶⁷

Because this was in any case the prime aim of [the Third Reich’s] policy toward Poland in the years when [the Third Reich] was not yet ready for a major war, Hitler would continue to maintain the course of accommodation with Warsaw in spite of the rebuff to his more ambitious concepts.

(Emphasis added.)